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Abstract  The paper presents a uniform analysis of the Bulgarian evidential in 
reportative  and  inferential  contexts.  The  Bulgarian  evidential  is  analyzed  as 
having both a temporal and an epistemic modal component. The analysis allows 
one  to  explain  why  the  evidential  can  be  used  to  report  false  beliefs  in 
reportative contexts  but  not in inferential  ones,  as well  as why the Bulgarian  
evidential cannot express inferences about the future. Both cases are problematic  
for  the  previous  analyses  of  evidentiality  in  Bulgarian  (Izvorski  1997,  Koev 
2011). 
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1    Background on evidentiality in Bulgarian
Evidentiality is a category that expresses the source of information on which the 
statement  is  based.  Most  commonly,  languages  encode the difference between 
direct  observation,  report  and  inference  (cf.  Willett  1988,  Aikhenvald  2004). 
Bulgarian  has  a  designated  verbal  paradigm that  expresses  evidential  meaning 
(discussed in section 2). A single verb form in the evidential paradigm can express 
either reportative or inferential evidence, depending on the context (cf. Izvorski 
1997). For example, in (1) the evidential form  pisala ‘write’ expresses that the 
speaker’s source of information for her claim that Maria was writing a book is a 
report. The same form in (2) expresses that the speaker’s source of information is 
inference. The type of evidential meaning is specified in square brackets.1
* This paper is a continuation of my dissertation research. I thank Brian Joseph, Judith Tonhauser 
and Craige Roberts for their detailed feedback and Anastasia Giannakidou, Stefan Kaufmann, 
Yusuke Kubota, Roumyana Pancheva, Magdalena Schwager, and the participants of SALT 21 for 
useful  discussions.  I’m grateful  to  Jungmee Lee  and  to  the editors  of  this  volume for  their 
comments on  an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Glosses  and  abbreviations:  EV=Evidential  operator,  FUT=Future  marker,  IMPERF= 
Imperfective  Aspect,  NOT=Negation;  PAST=Past  tense,  PAST  =  Past  stem  participial  form, 
PERF=Perfective  aspect,  PRES=Present  tense,  PRES=Present  stem participial  form, PL=Plural, 
PLE=Participle, REFL=Reflexive marker, SG=Singular, SUBJ= Subjunctive marker. 
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(1) Reportative  context:  Last  week  Ivan  told  you  that  Maria,  your  former 
classmate, spent last year writing a book, and that the book has just been 
published. You believe Ivan. At the class reunion, when someone asks you 
what Maria was doing last year, you say:2
Maria pisala                          kniga.
Maria write.IMPERF.PAST.PLE book
‘Maria was writing a book, [I heard].’
(2) Inferential context: Your late aunt Maria spent two months before her death 
in Paris. After her funeral, you found an unfinished manuscript about Paris 
in  her  apartment.  You inferred  that  shortly before  her  death  Maria  was 
writing a book. When one of the relatives wonders what Maria was doing in 
Paris before she died, you say:
Maria pisala                          kniga.
Maria write.IMPERF.PAST.PLE book
‘Maria was writing a book, [I inferred].’
In  her  influential  paper,  Izvorski  (1997)  proposes  a  uniform  analysis  of  the 
Bulgarian  evidential  in  inferential  and  reportative  contexts.  Her  analysis  is 
summarized in (3), where EV is the evidential operator and p is the proposition in 
its scope: 
(3) The interpretation of EV p (Izvorski 1997: 226)
          a. Assertion: □ p in view of the speaker’s knowledge state.
          b. Presupposition: Speaker has indirect evidence for p.
Izvorski’s  analysis  in  (3)  explains  why  the  evidential  form  pisala ‘write’  is 
felicitous in (1) and (2): in both contexts the speaker is committed to the truth of 
the proposition p (3a), and the speaker has indirect evidence for p (3b). 
Given that in Bulgarian the same form can express inferential and reportative 
evidence,  a  uniform  analysis  of  the  evidential  operator  is  highly  desirable. 
However,  below  I  show  that  there  are  differences  between  inferential  and 
reportative contexts as far as the distribution of evidential  forms is  concerned. 
These cases present a potential problem for a uniform semantic analysis. 
The  first  difference  pertains  to  the  speaker’s  epistemic  commitment  in 
reportative  and  inferential  contexts.  In  reportative  contexts,  such  as  (4),  the 
evidential can be used even if the speaker believes that the proposition  p in the 
scope of the evidential is false.
2 Evidential  forms in Bulgarian bear  participial  morphology.  I  gloss them as participles (PLE) 
rather than evidentials (EV).
276
The meaning of the Bulgarian evidential 
(4) Reportative context:  You just  came from a psychiatric  clinic,  where you 
visited your friend Eli. Eli was hospitalized because of severe hallucinations 
and  other  psychological  problems.  When  your  friend  inquires  about  the 
things Eli told you, you say: 
Izvănzemnite í     predložili                rabota v   kosmičeska laboratorija.
Aliens            her offer.PERF.PAST.PLE job      in space           laboratory
‘Aliens offered her a job in a space lab, [I heard].’
It is clear from the context in (4) that the speaker does not believe that poor Eli 
was offered a job by aliens. 
Unlike  reportative  contexts,  in  inferential  contexts  the  evidential  form  is 
infelicitous if the speaker believes that p is false, as shown in (5).  
(5) Inferential  context:  A month  ago Maria  applied for a highly competitive 
position in a NASA laboratory. When Maria announced that she is quitting 
her current job, you inferred that she got a job offer from NASA. Later, you 
learned that Maria was not offered a job by NASA. When your friend asks 
you why Maria is quitting her job, you say:
#NASA í     predložili               rabota. 
  NASA her offer.PERF.PAST.PLE job          
  ‘NASA offered her a job, [I inferred].’
Since in Izvorski’s uniform analysis the speaker considers p to be necessarily true 
(cf. (3a)), the analysis predicts the evidential to be infelicitous if the speaker does 
not  believe  p.  This  prediction  is  not  borne out,  as  the example in  (4)  shows. 
Moreover,  the  uniform  analysis  cannot  explain  why  the  speaker  has  to  be 
committed  to  the  truth  of  p in  inferential  contexts  (5)  but  not  in  reportative 
contexts (4). 
The second difference between inferential and reportative contexts pertains to 
the distribution of evidential forms that have future time reference. Bulgarian has 
a designated future evidential  form to refer to future events.  In (6), the future 
evidential  form  štjala  da  piše ‘will  write’  appears  in  a  reportative  evidential 
context and refers to some future time at which the eventuality of book writing is 
supposed to take place. 
(6) Reportative context: In the morning Ivan told you that Maria will spend the 
evening writing a portion of her book. When in the afternoon your friend 
asks you what Maria will do in the evening, you say:
Maria štjala      da     piše                               kniga.
Maria FUT.PLE SUBJ write.IMPERF.3SG.PRES book
‘Maria will be writing a book, [I heard].’
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However, when the future evidential form appears in an inferential context about 
the future, the intended evidential meaning is blocked, as shown in (7). 
(7) Inferential  context:  By looking  at  your  roommate  Maria’s  schedule  this 
morning you inferred that she plans to spend the evening writing a portion 
of her book. In the afternoon, when your friend asks you what Maria will 
do in the evening, you say:
# Maria štjala      da     piše                               kniga.
   Maria FUT.PLE SUBJ write.IMPERF.3SG.PRES book
   Intended: ‘Maria will be writing a book, [I inferred].’
The inability of future evidential forms to express inferences about the future is a 
well attested phenomenon not only in Bulgarian but in all Balkan languages that 
grammatically express evidentiality (cf. Newmark et al. 1982 on Albanian, Aksu-
Koç  and  Slobin  1986:  163  on  Turkish,  Friedman  2005:  27  on  Macedonian). 
However,  this  phenomenon  has  not  been  explored  in  the  formal  semantic 
literature.  Why future  evidential  forms  are  felicitous  in  reportative  but  not  in 
inferential  contexts  cannot be easily explained by a uniform semantic  analysis 
such as Izvorski 1997. 
 The  data  presented  in  (4)  –  (7)  raise  the  question  of  whether  a  uniform 
analysis of the Bulgarian evidential is still possible. In what follows, I propose a 
formal analysis of the evidential in Bulgarian that explains the contrast between 
reportative and inferential evidential contexts shown in (4) – (7), and, at the same 
time,  is  uniform.  The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  provides 
background on evidential morphology. Section 3 is the analysis. I show that the 
Bulgarian  evidential  has  both  an  epistemic  modal  component  and  a  temporal 
component.  Section  4  explains  why  future  evidential  forms  cannot  express 
inferences  about  the  future.  Section  5 compares  the  current  proposal  to  the 
previous analyses of evidentiality in Bulgarian (Izvorski 1997, Koev 2011) and 
shows  that  it  fares  better  than  its  competitors  on  empirical  and  theoretical 
grounds. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2    Background on evidential morphology
Bulgarian has a designated verbal  paradigm that  expresses evidential  meaning. 
Thus, for each verb form in the indicative paradigm, there is a corresponding verb 
form in the evidential paradigm. Table 1 lists evidential and indicative forms of 
the Bulgarian verb piša ‘write’ in the 3rd person singular, feminine gender. 
The forms of the indicative paradigm bear aspect, number, person, and tense 
inflections.  The  morphological  hallmark  of  evidential  forms  is  the  participia 
lmorpheme -l-, which is realized on the verb in the present (piše-l-) and in the past
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Indicative paradigm Evidential paradigm
Present piše-Ø  
write.IMPERF-3SG.PRES
piše-l-a  
write.IMPERF.PRES-PLE-FEM
Past pisa-Ø 
write.IMPERF-3SG.PAST
pisa-l-a 
write.IMPERF.PAST-PLE-FEM
Future šte    piše-Ø  
FUT write.IMPERF-3SG.PRES
štja-l-a               da        piše-Ø 
FUT-PLE-FEM SUBJ  write.IMPERF-3SG.PRES
Table 1 The evidential and the indicative paradigm in Bulgarian.
(pisa-l-)  form,  and  on  the  future  auxiliary  in  the  future  form  (štja-l-).  The 
evidential forms for the present and for the past have distinct stems, i.e. piše- and 
pisa-,  respectively, which,  as  I  argue  later,  encode  temporal  information  and 
function as relative tenses (cf. Smirnova 2011). Each evidential form bears clearly 
identifiable aspectual morphology (imperfective in the case of pisa- and piše-). As 
I show in the analysis  section,  aspectual  and temporal  morphemes make truth 
conditional contributions to the meaning of evidential sentences.
3    The analysis of the Bulgarian evidential construction 
I propose that the meaning of evidential sentences in Bulgarian is derived from the 
semantic contribution of (i) the evidential operator, (ii) grammatical aspect, and 
(iii) tense. I argue that the evidential operator has both a modal and a temporal 
component.  In  section  3.1,  I  discuss  the  modal  meaning  of  the  Bulgarian 
evidential  operator.  Section  3.2  focuses  on  the  temporal  component  of  the 
evidential construction. Section 3.3. spells out the formal analysis. 
3.1    The epistemic modal component of the evidential construction 
Izvorski  (1997)  convincingly shows  that  in  inferential  evidential  contexts  the 
Bulgarian evidential has a modal component. According to her analysis, (i) the 
proposition p in the scope of the evidential is interpreted with respect to the belief 
worlds of the speaker, and (ii) the speaker considers p to be an epistemic necessity 
(see (3a)). The example in (8) supports the modal analysis by showing that the 
speaker’s  belief  worlds,  and  not  the  actual  world,  are  relevant  for  the 
interpretation of the proposition in the scope of the evidential. In (8), Maria is not 
writing a book in the actual world. Yet the evidential construction is felicitous in 
such a context, because p is true in the worlds compatible with what the speaker 
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believes. 
(8) Inferential context: After your aunt Maria died, Ivan found a first chapter of 
an  unauthored  manuscript  in  her  apartment.  He inferred  that  Maria  was 
writing a book. You know that it was Maria’s sister who was writing the 
book, not Maria. When someone asks Ivan what Maria was doing before she 
died, he says: 
Maria pisala                          kniga.
Maria write.IMPERF.PAST.PLE book
‘Maria was writing a book, [I inferred].’
As  far  as  the  strength  of  the  speaker’s  commitment  is  concerned,  I  assume, 
following Izvorski (1997), that the evidential encodes a universal quantificational 
force. This assumption is supported by the fact that the evidential is infelicitous if 
the speaker views the proposition p as a mere possibility (9). 
(9) Inferential  context:  After your aunt Maria died,  you found an unfinished 
manuscript in her apartment. It could be the case that Maria was writing a 
book, or it could be that the manuscript was written by Maria’s sister. You 
are not sure. When someone asks you what Maria was doing before she 
died, you say: 
 # Maria pisala                           kniga.
  Maria write.IMPERF.PAST.PLE book
‘Maria was writing a book, [I inferred].’
The  modal  analysis  is  further  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  Bulgarian 
evidential  patterns  with  modals  with  respect  to  the  modal  subordination 
phenomenon  (cf.  McCready  and  Ogata  2007  on  Japanese  evidentials).3 The 
example in (10a), adapted from Roberts 1989: 697, shows that the modal  might 
blocks  anaphoric  reference  between  the  pronominal  subject  he in  the  second 
sentence and its antecedent a thief in the first sentence. The anaphoric dependence 
is  possible  only if  the sentence with the pronominal  subject  contains a modal 
element, such as would in (10b). 
(10) a. A thiefi might break into the house. # Hei takes the silver.
b. A thiefi might break into the house. Hei would take the silver.
        
The examples in (11) show that the Bulgarian evidential patterns with modals as 
far  as  the modal  subordination phenomenon is  concerned:  the  evidential  form 
izjal ‘ate’ in  (11a)  blocks  anaphoric  reference between the subject  of  the first 
3  For the sake of space, I do not discuss other modal diagnostics here but see Smirnova 2011.
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sentence,  Ivan,  and the referential  pronoun  toj ‘he’ in  the second sentence.  If, 
however, the second sentence contains a modal, such as  trjabva ‘must’ in (11b), 
the anaphoric dependency is reestablished. 
(11) Inferential context: Last night there was a full tray of baklava in the fridge, 
but now it is gone. When you go to Ivan’s room you notice baklava crumbs 
all over the place. You inferred that Ivan ate the baklava. When Maria asks 
you what happened to the baklava, you say:
a. Ivani izja-l                   baklavata. # Toji beše              gladen.
    Ivan eat.PERF.PAST.PLE baklava.        He  be.3SG.PAST hungry.
    ‘Ivan ate the baklava, [I inferred]. He was hungry.’
b. Ivani izja-l                  baklavata.  Toji trjabva        da     e   bil       gladen. 
    Ivan eat.PERF.PAST.PLE baklava.      He  must.PRES SUBJ be be.PLE hungry.
    ‘Ivan ate the baklava, [I inferred]. He must have been hungry.’
The parallel between (10) and (11) provides further support for the modal analysis 
of the Bulgarian evidential.  
Can the modal analysis of the evidential in inferential contexts outlined above 
be extended to account for the meaning of the evidential in reportative contexts? 
As discussed in section 1, one problem with the assumption that in reportative 
contexts the proposition p in the scope of the evidential is interpreted with respect 
to the speaker’s belief worlds is that in such contexts the speaker does not have to 
be committed to the truth of p. In (12), the speaker believes that p is false, yet the 
evidential form is felicitous (see also 4).
(12) Reportative context: Ivan told you that before she died, Maria was writing a 
book. You know that it was Maria’s sister who was writing the book, not 
Maria. When Ivan commends Maria for writing a book, you say:
Maria pisala                          kniga! Ta       tja  nito  edin red  
Maria write.IMPERF.PAST.PLE book    EMPH she NOT one  line 
ne    e                   napisala.
NOT be.3SG.PRES write.PERF.PAST.PLE   
‘Maria was writing a book, [I hear]! She hasn’t written a single line.’
Faller (2002) argues that a felicitous assertion of the form EV p followed by the 
denial  of  p,  shown in  (12)  for  Bulgarian,  is  an  indication  that  the  evidential 
construction does not have a modal component. This argument is based on the 
assumption that a modal statement cannot be used if the speaker knows for a fact 
whether p is true or false. 
Shall we assume that the Bulgarian evidential in reportative contexts does not 
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have a modal component? This position is advocated by Sauerland and Schenner 
(2007) in their analysis of evidentiality in Bulgarian, shown in (13), where rep is 
the evidential operator in reportative contexts, and p is a proposition in its scope. 
(13) The interpretation of [[REP]](y, v)(p) (Sauerland and Schenner 2007: 532)
      a.  Presupposition: y has in v reportative evidence for p
      b.  Assertion:  p
Since Sauerland and Schenner’s analysis is non-modal, the proposition  p  in the 
scope of the evidential is interpreted with respect to the actual world. Such an 
analysis predicts the evidential construction to be infelicitous if the state of affairs 
described by  p  does not hold in the actual world. That such an analysis is not 
suitable for the Bulgarian evidential in reportative contexts is seen from the data 
in (4). In (4), Eli  was not offered a job by aliens in the actual world,  yet the 
evidential construction is felicitous in such a context. 
I conclude that the data in (12) do not argue against a modal analysis of the 
evidential in reportative contexts (contra Faller 2002). What the pattern in (12) 
indicates is that the speaker’s belief worlds are irrelevant for the interpretation of 
the  proposition  in  reportative  contexts.  I argue  that  the modal  analysis  of  the 
evidential  in reportative contexts is  still  possible under the assumption that in 
such contexts the proposition in the scope of the evidential is  interpreted with 
respect to the original reporter’s belief worlds, not those of the speaker. Such an 
analysis of the evidential in reportative contexts is modeled after reports de dicto 
and constructions with reportative verbs such as say, shown in (14).
(14) Ivan believes/says that it is raining but it is not raining.
The  sentence  in  (14)  is  felicitous  because  the  proposition  p (it  is  raining)  is 
evaluated  with  respect  to  Ivan’s  belief  worlds  in  the  first  conjunct,  and  with 
respect to the speaker’s belief worlds in the second conjunct.4 I propose that the 
same explanation applies to the evidential construction in (12). The proposition 
that Maria is writing a book is interpreted with respect to the reporter’s belief 
worlds, not those of the speaker. Thus, in a reportative context the speaker can 
felicitously follow up the assertion of the form EV p with the denial of  p. This 
analysis explains why the speakers can use the evidential to report information 
they believe to be false. 
4 The data in (14) suggest that Faller’s criterion, i.e. the infelicity when the embedded proposition 
is known to be false by the speaker, is only a sufficient, not a necessary condition for a modal  
analysis.  Propositional  operators  believe and  say are standardly analyzed  as  having a modal 
component (Ogihara 1996, Abusch 1997). Yet embedding a proposition under the verb of saying, 
and then denying it, does not render the construction infelicitous, as shown in (14).
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Grammatical Component: Evidential operator Evidential Tense Aspect
Encodes temporal relation 
between.... ST and EAT EAT and RT RT and ET
Table 2 Temporal relations in the evidential construction in Bulgarian.
In the next section, I discuss the temporal contribution of the evidential. This 
discussion  provides  the  background  needed  to  explain  why  the  Bulgarian 
evidential cannot express inferences about the future. 
3.2    The temporal component of the evidential construction 
As the data in Table 1 have shown, the Bulgarian evidential has different forms 
for the present, past, and future. Moreover, the distribution of these forms depends 
on the temporal  relations specified in the contexts.  For example,  only the past 
tense evidential pisala ‘write’ is felicitous in the context in (15).
(15) Reportative  context:  Last  month  Ivan  told  you  that  Maria,  your  former 
classmate, spent last year writing a book, and that the book has just been 
published. At the class reunion, when someone asks you what Maria was 
doing last year, you say:
Maria pisala                          / # pišela                          kniga.
Maria write.IMPERF.PAST.PLE / # write.IMPERF.PRES.PLE book
‘Maria was writing a book, [I heard].’
Previous  analyses  of  the  Bulgarian  evidential  lack  a  temporal  component  (cf. 
Izvorski 1997) and, as a consequence, cannot explain the pattern in (15).
The  temporal  analysis  I  propose  is  couched  within  a  neo-Reichenbachian 
framework (Klein 1994). The traditional temporal ontology, consisting of Speech 
Time  (ST),  Reference  Time  (RT)  and  Event  Time  (ET),  is  enriched  with  an 
additional  temporal  parameter:  Evidence  Acquisition  Time  (EAT).  EAT, 
originally introduced in Lee 2011, is the time at which the speaker acquires the 
relevant evidence for the proposition p in the scope of the evidential. In (15), for 
example, EAT is the time at which the speaker learns from Ivan that Maria wrote 
a book. I argue that relations between EAT, ST, RT and ET are specified by the 
evidential operator, evidential tense, and grammatical aspect, as shown in Table 2.
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3.2.1    The temporal contribution of the evidential operator
An emerging body of the literature has shown that  most  commonly evidential 
constructions  encode  a  precedence  relation  between  EAT and  ST  (Lee  2011, 
Smirnova  2011).  This  assumption  is  intuitively justified:  in  order  to  utter  an 
evidential  sentence,  the  speaker  must  acquire  the  relevant  evidence  first.  It  is 
infelicitous to use the evidential construction before the speaker has acquired the 
relevant evidence, i.e. when ST precedes EAT (EAT < ST), as shown by (16). 
Neither  the past  evidential  form  zagubila ‘lost’  nor  the future evidential  form 
štjala  da zagubi ‘will  lose’ in  (16a)  can express  that  the speaker  will  acquire 
reportative evidence in  the future.  In order to convey the intended meaning, a 
construction with the matrix clause reportative verb must be used instead (16b).
(16) Reportative context: You just finished watching the World Cup final, where 
the Netherlands lost to Spain 0 to 1. A minute later, Maria, who is a big fan 
of  the Netherlands  team,  calls  you on the  phone.  Before picking up the 
phone, you say to your husband:
         a. # Holandija zagubila               /  štjala     da     zagubi.
                Holland   lose.PERF.PAST.PLE / FUT.PLE SUBJ lose.PERF.3SG.PRES 
             Intended: ‘The Netherlands lost, [I will hear].’
         b. Maria šte   kaže,                 če    Holandija  zagubi.
             Maria FUT say.IMPERF.3SG that Holland     lose.PERF.3SG.PAST
             ‘Maria will say that the Netherlands lost.’
In the rest of this paper, I assume that the evidential operator in Bulgarian encodes 
a precedence relation between EAT and ST (EAT < ST).5 
3.2.2    The meaning of the evidential tense
 
In this section, I argue that evidential tense should be analyzed as relative. 
A tense is relative if it is interpreted not with respect to ST but with respect to 
5 There  are  special  contexts in Bulgarian when EAT overlaps  with ST,  i.e.  when the speaker  
acquires the relevant evidence as she speaks. Such a temporal configuration is always associated 
with an exclamative intonational contour, as in (i):
(i)  Reportative context: You ran into your old classmate Ivan, who tells you that Maria, an old 
friend of yours, has a successful academic career. In fact, right now she is busy writing a book. 
Upon hearing this news, you exclaim: 
Maria pišela                              kniga!
Maria write.IMPERF.PRES.PLE book
‘Maria is writing a book, [I hear]!’
I exclude evidential constructions with exclamative intonation from the discussion in this paper,  
thus excluding situations in which EAT overlaps with ST. See Smirnova 2011 for the analysis.
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some other contextually relevant  time.  For example,  tenses in complements  of 
propositional  attitude  verbs  and  reportative  verbs  are  relative:  the  time  of 
interpretation is determined by the tense on the main verb (Ogihara 1996, Abusch 
1997,  Gennari  2003).  Thus,  in  (17)  the  embedded  future  form  would  play is 
interpreted  with  respect  to  the  time  of  saying,  which  is  located  in  the  past. 
Therefore, the relevant reference time at which the piano playing event takes place 
can precede or follow ST, as the distribution of temporal adverbials in (17) shows.
(17) Ivan said [that Maria would play the piano yesterday/tomorrow].
An alternative analysis, under which the future tense in the embedded clause is 
absolute,  i.e.  is  interpreted  with  respect  to  ST,  incorrectly  predicts  that  the 
reference time, and, consequently, the event of piano playing can only be located 
in the future with respect to ST. 
The distribution of future evidential forms, such as štjala da piše ‘will write’ 
in (18), suggests that the evidential tense has a relative interpretation. In (18), the 
relevant reference time (as well as the eventuality of book writing) is past with 
respect  to  ST.  The  usage  of  the  future  evidential  form  in  (18)  can  only  be 
explained if  the speaker presents  the eventuality of book writing as located at 
some reference time which is future relative to EAT. 
(18) Reportative context: In the morning, Ivan told you that Maria will spend the 
afternoon writing a portion of her book. In the evening, when your friend 
asks you what Maria was doing in the afternoon, you say:
Maria  štjala      da    piše                                kniga.
Maria  FUT.PLE SUBJ write.IMPERF.3SG.PRES book.
Lit.: ‘Maria will be writing a book, [I heard].’
Further support for the assumption that EAT, and not ST, serves as the time of 
interpretation for evidential tenses comes from the distribution of past and present 
evidential forms. In (19), the reference time coincides with EAT. Only the present 
stem evidential, pišela ‘write’, is felicitous in such a context. In (20), on the other 
hand, the relevant reference time (as well as the book writing event) is past with 
respect to EAT, and only the past stem form pisala ‘wrote’ is felicitous in such a 
context. 
(19) Reportative  context:  Last  month  at  the  class  reunion  Ivan told  you that 
Maria is busy writing a book.  When your old school friend asks you what 
Maria was doing last month, you say:
Maria pišela                         / # pisala                          kniga.
Maria write.IMPERF.PRES.PLE/ # write.IMPERF.PAST.PLE book
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‘I heard that Maria was writing a book (at the time of the report).’
     Lit.: ‘Maria is writing a book, [I heard].’
(20) Reportative  context:  Last  month  Ivan  told  you  that  Maria,  your  former 
classmate, spent last year writing a book, and that the book has just been 
published. At the class reunion, when someone asks you what Maria was 
doing last year, you say:
Maria pisala                          / # pišela                           kniga.
Maria write.IMPERF.PAST.PLE / # write.IMPERF.PRES.PLE book
‘I heard that Maria had been writing a book.’
          Lit.: ‘Maria was writing a book, [I heard].’
In the next section, I show how the assumption that the evidential encodes a 
precedence relation between EAT and ST (EAT < ST), and the assumption that 
the  evidential  tense  is  relative,  make  correct  predictions  about  the  temporal 
meaning of evidential sentences. 
3.2.3    Temporal relations in evidential sentences: a larger picture
Consider  the  evidential  sentence in  (21).  The future evidential  form  štjala  da 
piše ‘will write’ can either express that the eventuality of book writing is located 
at some time which is future with respect to ST, or at some time which is past 
with respect to ST. This is shown by the contexts in (21a) and (21b), respectively.
(21) Maria štjala      da     piše                               kniga.
          Maria FUT.PLE SUBJ write.IMPERF.3SG.PRES book
          ‘Maria will be writing a book, [I heard].’
a. Context 1 (ST < ET):   Ivan told you in the morning that Maria will spend 
the  evening  writing  a  portion  of  her  book.  In  the  afternoon,  when 
someone asks you what Maria will be doing in the evening, you say (21).
b. Context 2 (ET < ST): Ivan told you in the morning that Maria will spend 
the afternoon writing her book. In the evening, when someone asks you 
what Maria was doing in the afternoon, you say (21).
The temporal meaning of the evidential sentence in (21) is derived as follows. The 
evidential operator specifies that EAT precedes ST (EAT < ST), as shown in (22a). 
With respect to the meaning of tense, I assume that it encodes a relation between 
RT and the  time  of  evaluation  (cf.  Klein  1994).  Since  the  evidential  tense  is 
relative, the future evidential form  štjala da piše ‘will write’ locates RT in the 
future with respect to EAT (EAT < RT), as in (22b). Finally, as it is standardly 
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assumed within the (neo-)Reichenbachian framework, the imperfective aspect on 
piše ‘write’ encodes  that  RT is  a subset  of  ET (22c).  From these relations,  it 
follows that the eventuality of book writing can either precede or follow ST, as 
shown in (22d).
(22) a. Evidential operator: EAT < ST
b. Future tense: EAT < RT
c. Imperfective aspect: RT⊆ET
d. From (a)-(c): ST < ET or ET < ST 
The analysis in (22) correctly predicts that the future evidential  form  štjala da 
piše ‘will write’ can refer to events which are future or past with respect to ST (cf. 
the two contexts in (21)). 
The discussion in sections 3.1 and 3.2 provides the necessary background for 
the formal analysis of the evidential in Bulgarian, presented in section 3.3.
3.3    Formal analysis of the Bulgarian evidential 
I propose that the evidential construction in Bulgarian has the truth conditions as 
in (23).
(23) For any model M, assignment function g, time t, and worlds w, w'
[[EV p]]  M, g, t, w (w) (t) is defined iff the speaker has concrete evidence for p, 
where concrete evidence subsumes reports from someone else or evidence-
based inferences about p.
If defined, [[EV p]]  M, g, t, w (w) (t) =1 iff there exists a time t'', located before 
the  evaluation  time t  in w,  such  that  the  speaker  acquires  the  concrete 
evidence for  p  at t''  and for all world-time pairs <w',  t'> compatible with 
what the relevant epistemic agent, the speaker or the reporter, believes in w 
at t'', p is true in w' at t'.
The semantics of the evidential operator is spelled out in (24).
(24) EV: λQ λw λt ∃t''[(t''< t) & (∀ w', t')[(w', t') ∈MBDOX(α)(w, t'') → Q(w')(t')]], 
where t'' is  EAT; t is  the  time  of  evaluation  for  the  entire  evidential 
sentence;  t' is the structural equivalent of  t'' in the belief worlds, i.e. the 
attitude holder’s now), α = speaker in inferential contexts, α = reporter in 
reportative contexts.
According to the proposed meaning in (24), the evidential operator encodes that 
there  is  a  time  at  which  the  speaker  acquires  the  relevant  evidence  for  the 
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proposition she reports,  i.e. EAT (t'').  The evidential  specifies that the time of 
evidence acquisition precedes  t,  the time of evaluation of the entire evidential 
utterance, as coded by (t'' < t). In matrix clauses, t is identified with ST.6 
Similar to necessity modals, the evidential has universal quantificational force, 
thus  asserting that  the proposition in  the scope of  the evidential  is  true in  all 
world-time pairs compatible with what the relevant epistemic agent believes in the 
actual  world  w at  the  time  t''.  The  time  t' is  the  structural  equivalent  of  the 
evidence acquisition time (t'') in the belief worlds; it corresponds to the attitude 
holder’s now (cf. von Stechow 1995, Ogihara 1996, Abusch 1997). Technically 
speaking,  it  is  the  attitude  holder’s  now  (t'),  and  not  t'',  i.e.  the  evidence 
acquisition time, that serves as the time of evaluation for the proposition in the 
scope  of  the  evidential.  Under  this  analysis,  any evidential  sentence  has  two 
evaluation  times,  the  evaluation  time  for  the  proposition  in  the  scope  of  the 
evidential operator, i.e. the attitude holder’s now, and the evaluation time for the 
whole evidential utterance, which is ST in main clauses. 
The definition in (24) guarantees that similarly to modals, the evidential is 
compatible  with  different  modal  bases,  which  are  contextually determined.  In 
inferential  contexts,  the proposition in the scope of the evidential  is  evaluated 
with respect to the doxastic modal base relativized to the speaker (MBDOX (speaker)). 
In reportative contexts, the proposition is evaluated with respect to the doxastic 
modal base relativized to the original reporter (MBDOX (reporter)), whose statement the 
speaker  repeats.  The proposed definition  allows  for  a  uniform analysis  of  the 
Bulgarian evidential in both reportative and inferential contexts.7
In the next section, I show how the proposed analysis explains the inability of 
future evidential forms to express inferences about the future.
4    Explaining why the evidential cannot express inferences about the future
The example in (25) shows that the Bulgarian evidential cannot express inferences 
about the future (cf. also (7)). 
(25) Inferential  context:  When  you  looked  at  the  sky this  afternoon,  it  was 
cloudy. You inferred that it would rain tonight. Your friend is planning a 
picnic in the evening, and asks you your opinion about the weather. At the 
time of the conversation, you still believe that it will rain tonight. You say: 
# Štjalo     da     vali                                dovečera.
    FUT.PLE  SUBJ rain.IMPERF.3SG.PRES   tonight
  Intended: ‘It will rain tonight, [I inferred].’  
6 If the evidential is embedded under a propositional attitude verb, the time of the evaluation (t) 
would be identified with the event time of the matrix verb (cf. Ogihara 1996, Abusch 1997). 
7 Due to space limitations, I do not present the compositional analysis here. See Smirnova 2011.
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Consider the meaning of the future evidential sentence in (25). According to the 
analysis proposed in the previous section, the proposition  p  in the scope of the 
evidential is evaluated with respect to EAT/attitude holder’s now, which is located 
in the past of ST. The future tense of the evidential specifies that p will be realized 
at some future time with respect to its evaluation time. Moreover, in inferential 
contexts, the speaker considers p to be necessarily true. Thus, by using (25), the 
speaker communicates that at  some time in the past she held the belief that  it 
would  rain at  some future  time.  The assertion  that  p is  necessarily true  with 
respect to the speaker’s past belief states, communicated by the future evidential 
sentence in (25), is weaker than the assertion that  p is true with respect to the 
speaker’s current belief states. Thus, the evidential sentence in (25) violates the 
maxim of quantity: at the time of the conversation the speaker believes that p will 
be realized at some future time, yet she asserts her commitment to p with respect 
to some past time. The same effect is observed in the English example in (26), 
where  the  past  tense  on  the  verb  believe shifts  the  evaluation  time  of  the 
proposition p (it will rain tonight) to the past (cf. Abusch 1997). 
(26) Context: same as (25)
# I believed it would rain tonight.
That epistemic contexts such as (25) are incompatible with constructions that 
enable epistemic agents to assess future events from a past perspective only, is 
seen from the contrast between (27a) and (27b). 
(27) Context: same as (25)
a.  Trjabva-Ø      da     vali                               dovečera.
      must-PRES     SUBJ rain.IMPERF.3SG.PRES  tonight.
     ‘In all probability, it will rain tonight.’ 
b. # Trjabva-še    da     vali                               dovečera.
       must-PAST    SUBJ  rain.IMPERF.3SG.PRES  tonight.
      ‘It was supposed to rain tonight.’ 
(27a)  is  a  construction  with  the  present  tense  epistemic  modal  trjabva ‘must’ 
Assuming with Condoravdi (2002) that tense on the modal specifies the time of 
evaluation for the proposition in its scope, the proposition in the scope of trjabva 
‘must’ in (27a) is interpreted with respect to ST/the speaker’s current belief states. 
Constructions with present tense epistemic modals such as (27a)  are standardly 
used to express inferences about the future in Bulgarian. If, however, the tense on 
the modal and hence the evaluation time for the proposition in its scope is past, as 
in (27b), the construction becomes infelicitous in contexts such as (25). 
The  contrast  between  (27a)  and  (27b)  suggests  that  in  epistemic  contexts 
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about the future, the speaker is required to reassess her earlier inference that p and 
to evaluate p with respect to ST/her current belief states. This requirement might 
be due to the fact that the possibility of an event happening changes as the time 
progresses. As Condoravdi 2002: 81 observes, “certain states of affairs are live 
options for the future at some time but cease to be live options for the future at a 
later  time.”  Unlike  epistemic  modals,  which  change  the  evaluation  time 
depending on the tense (cf. (27a) vs. (27b)), in evidential sentences such as the 
one in (25), the evaluation time is conventionally restricted to the past by virtue of 
the meaning of the evidential operator. Thus, the evidential can only express the 
speaker’s commitment to p with respect to some past time. This is what makes the 
future evidential construction infelicitous in inferential contexts. 
Unlike inferential contexts, future evidential forms in reportative contexts are 
felicitous, as shown in (28).
(28) Reportative context:  According to the weather forecast that you heard an 
hour  ago,  it  is  supposed to  rain this  evening.  Your friend is  planning a 
picnic  in  the  evening,  and  when  she  asks  you  your  opinion  about  the 
weather, you say:
Štjalo    da     vali                               dovečera. 
FUT.PLE SUBJ rain.IMPERF.3SG.PRES  tonight
‘It will rain tonight, [I heard].’  
According to the analysis proposed in the previous section, reportative contexts 
crucially differ from inferential ones in that the proposition in the scope of the 
evidential  is  interpreted with respect  to  the reporter’s  belief  worlds.  Thus,  the 
evidential  construction  in  reportative  contexts  does  not  communicate  anything 
about the speaker’s commitment at the time of the conversation. Therefore, the 
principle that rules out future evidential forms in inferential contexts, as discussed 
above, does not apply in reportative contexts. 
5    Previous analyses of evidentiality in Bulgarian
5.1    Izvorski’s (1997) uniform analysis of the Bulgarian evidential
One  of  the  most  interesting  and  influential  aspects  of  Izvorski’s  analysis, 
presented in (3), is the assumption that evidentials should be anlayzed on a par 
with  epistemic  modals.  While  the  assumption  that  the  evidential  has  a  modal 
component  is  essentially  correct,  there  are  some  technical  problems  with 
Izvorski’s analysis.
First,  the  assumption  that  the  speaker  is  committed  to  the  truth  of  the 
proposition  p incorrectly predicts  that the speaker cannot  use the evidential  in 
reportative contexts if she believes that p is false. Izvorski attempts to circumvent 
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this problem by assuming that the ordering source imposes additional restrictions 
on the set of worlds provided by the modal base. She proposes that worlds in 
which the source of information is considered to be unreliable are eliminated. This 
assumption  affects  the  modal  force,  allowing it  to  vary from universal  (if  no 
worlds are eliminated) to existential (if there is a difference between the original 
and the resultant set) (cf. also Faller’s (2002) discussion of Izvorski). However, 
even this variability in the modal force, “between weak possibility to necessity” 
(Izvorski 1997), still commits the speaker to the belief that p is at least possible. 
Reports  of  false  beliefs  can  be  easily explained  under  the  assumption  that  in 
reportative contexts the proposition in the scope of the evidential is interpreted 
with respect to the original reporter’s belief worlds, as I proposed in section 3.
The  second  problem  for  Izvorski’s  analysis  is  the  lack  of  the  temporal 
component. Thus, her analysis predicts that the distribution of evidential forms is 
not sensitive to the temporal relations specified in the contexts. Specifically, her 
analysis cannot explain the difference in the distribution between past and present 
tense evidential forms, shown in (19) and (20). 
In conclusion, the analysis I propose retains the main insights of Izvorski’s 
original proposal: it has a modal component and allows for a uniform analysis of 
the evidential operator in reportative and in inferential contexts. In addition, my 
analysis explains the temporal meaning of the evidential and accounts for reports 
of false beliefs. 
5.2    Koev’s (2011) temporal analysis 
Koev (2011) recognizes that the Bulgarian evidential has a temporal component. 
Similarly to the analysis I presented here (see also Smirnova 2011), Koev employs 
the  four  temporal  parameters,  i.e.  RT,  ET,  ST,  and  EAT,  for  the  analysis  of 
temporal  relations  in  evidential  sentences.8 However,  our  temporal  analyses 
radically  differ  with  respect  to  how  the  labor  is  allocated  between  different 
components of the evidential construction. First, Koev assumes that the evidential 
in reportative and inferential contexts encodes that RT precedes EAT (RT < EAT). 
Second, in his analysis the evidential tense specifies the temporal location of RT 
with respect to ST. Thus, he assumes that evidential tense is absolute, not relative. 
I  find  both  assumptions  to  be  problematic.  First,  as  I  argued  above,  the 
absolute  tense  analysis  cannot  be  maintained  for  Bulgarian.  Such  an  analysis 
cannot explain why future evidential forms can refer to eventualities that are past 
with respect to ST (cf. (18)), nor can it explain the difference in the distribution of 
past and present tense evidential forms in (19) and (20).
Second,  the  assumption  that  the  evidential  in  reportative  and  inferential 
8 Koev  uses  different  terminology:  EAT,  RT,  ET,  and  ST  in  my analysis  correspond  to  his 
Learning Time (LRN), Topic Time (TT), ET, and Utterance Time (UT), respectively.
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contexts  encodes  a  precedence  relation  between  RT  and  EAT  (RT  <  EAT) 
predicts that the evidential cannot be used if RT coincides with EAT (RT = EAT) 
or,  for  that  reason,  if  RT is  future  with  respect  to  EAT (EAT < RT).  These 
temporal  contexts  are  presented  in  (29)  and  (30),  respectively.  Contra  to  the 
predictions of Koev’s analysis, the evidential form is felicitous in both contexts.
(29)  Reportative context (RT = EAT): At the class reunion last month Ivan told 
you that Maria is  busy writing a book. Two weeks later,  when your old 
friend asks you what kept Maria from coming to the class reunion, you say:
Maria pišela                          kniga.
Maria write.IMPERF.PRES.PLE book
‘Maria was writing a book, I heard.’
           
(30) Reportative context (EAT < RT): In the morning Ivan told you that Maria 
will spend the evening writing a portion of her book. When in the afternoon 
your friend asks you what Maria will do in the evening, you say:
Maria štjala      da     piše                               kniga.
Maria FUT.PLE SUBJ write.IMPERF.3SG.PRES book
‘Maria will be writing a book, [I heard].’
While  Koev  presents  an  interesting  perspective  on  the  meaning  of  the 
evidential  in  Bulgarian  –  his  analysis  also  discusses  the  discourse  status  of 
information expressed by the evidential prejacent, a topic that I don’t cover here – 
his temporal analysis, and, specifically, the assumption that the evidential tense is 
absolute,  as  well  as  the  assumption  that  the  evidential  in  inferential  and 
reportative contexts encodes that RT precedes EAT, cannot be maintained. 
6    Conclusions
In this paper I have proposed a uniform analysis of the Bulgarian evidential in 
reportative and inferential contexts. I argued that the Bulgarian evidential has a 
temporal and an epistemic modal component. The modal component specifies that 
the proposition in the scope of the evidential is interpreted with respect to the 
doxastic  modal  base  relativized  to  the  speaker  in  inferential  contexts  and the 
doxastic  modal  base  relativized  to  the  reporter  in  reportative  contexts.  The 
temporal component encodes that there is a contextually salient time at which the 
speaker  has  acquired  the  relevant  evidence  for  her  evidential  statement.  This 
analysis has a wider empirical coverage than the previous analyses of evidentiality 
in Bulgarian (Izvorski 1997, Koev 2011). It explains why in reportative contexts 
the speakers can use the evidential to report false beliefs, and accounts for the 
inability of the Bulgarian evidential to express inferences about the future. 
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